To the memory and the activity of Dede Boden, who was an integral participant in, and an inspiration to, this research

Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things

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1 Introduction: Theory – Some Signposts

Dialectic of Enlightenment

It is now some sixty years since Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno first published *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the book that was to be the handbook of critical theory. Critical theory's classic dialectic grew from the study of the *ancien regime*: of feudalism, absolutism, of *gemeinschaftlich* social relations. The dialectic developed from the analysis of a regime in which social position was fixed by birth; in which serfs were tied to the soil; in which an absolutist monarch ruled through the mediation of aristocracy and Church; in which men fought and died for King and religion. From this medieval darkness of necessity arose *Les Lumières*, bringing light and transparency to what was darkness and obscurity, bringing the rationally established rights of man into a space where previously there were only obligations, legitimated not by reason but by tradition. From this darkness of necessity rose the freedom of possibilities of social mobility, so that birth did not fix social position generation after generation. Breaking with the cyclical time of peasants' crops and nobles' migration from country house to court emerged a temporality of progress and possibility. Killing off a vengeful God and putting the potential of humanity in his place, Enlightenment arose dialectically out of

darkness also in markets, in freedom of expression, in burgeoning citizenship, in the emergence of *le peuple*, opening up a space of autonomy, of emancipation, where once there had been chains. This was Enlightenment. Enlightenment for critical theorists was an emancipation of outer nature, of inner nature and of social nature.

But Enlightenment contained within itself a contradictory logic: a logic in which its core values turned into their opposites. Enlightenment here for Horkheimer and Adorno becomes a new darkness of myth – as quality turns to quantity, freedom to necessity, autonomy to determinacy and emancipation to new chains. With the removal of Church and King, man himself took on powers to realize his potential in a number of arenas. With Enlightenment and the demythification of outer nature, science – Galileo, Newton – took on the ability, the power, to know nature. Human inner nature was emancipated from the Church's teachings on morality and original sin. For its part, social nature was liberated from the unholy trinity of kings, priests and nobles. Indeed, with the rise of the social contract, natural rights and the people, the very meaning of society changed. Previously associated with gatherings of the upper classes at balls and banquets and other exclusive settings, society came to mean the people, the rights-bearing citizens of the newly emergent public realm. But Enlightenment's dialectic turned emancipation into domination. Enlightenment's enabling power was changed into a new darkness of power as domination. *Savoir*, or knowledge, became linked to *pouvoir*. This was not emancipatory knowledge. Man's power to explore nature became his power to use nature as an instrument, to commodify and deplete it. The emancipation of man's inner nature was transformed into institutional power over inner nature as the clinic, the prison, the school and the factory normalized and disciplined. In social nature this reversal was the most extreme, as bureaucratic and authoritarian power allied to a new brutality in racial ideologies underscored the rise of fascism.

One major sphere in which the dialectic of Enlightenment played out perniciously for Horkheimer and Adorno was in the realm of the *culture industry*. The point for critical theorists was that a previously autonomous or relatively autonomous sphere now itself came under the industrial principle. This meant that culture, once a space of freedom, came under the principle of instrumental rationality, became instrumental in the hands of Hollywood and the emergent monopoly concentration of capital in publishing, recording and advertising. It meant that culture, previously a source of edification, the *Bildung* of human potential, turned into a machinery of control, whose main goal was the expenditure of resources in the interests of the financial profitability of corporate oligopolies. Culture took on the same principle of accumulation already widespread in the capitalist economy. Now the logic of the factory colonized the dream factories of the culture industry.[1] Now culture, previously associated with the development of human subjectivity,

became objective like any other commodity.[2] The implication for Horkheimer and Adorno was that culture, previously a site for critique and a place of non-identity, became subsumed under capitalism's logic of identity. In this identity-logic, the heterogeneity – the grain of the artwork – is reduced to identical units of utility; the qualitative, internal values of things are reduced to identical units of exchange-value and quantities of money. Industrialized culture, for Horkheimer and Adorno, is homogenized culture. In homogenized culture one unit is like every other. One unit, in its nature as commodity and instrumentality, is identical to any other. This was the principle of identity that Horkheimer and Adorno deplored. It was the principle against which critique was to be launched. For critical theory, with the proletariat incorporated into the newly 'organized capitalism' from the First World War, the only place for critique had been culture, which was autonomous from the principle of identity, from the atomism and normalization of the economy. But now, with the rise of the culture industry, this atomization also invaded culture, creating what Marcuse (1991) later called 'one-dimensional man'.

Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of culture industry is one of the founding sources of what later has become known as cultural studies. Its resonance has been of course much wider, throughout the human sciences. In this book – on *global* culture industry – we argue that things have moved on since the time at which Horkheimer and Adorno were writing. This is a book not about culture industry but about *global* culture industry. This is a book that follows, or tracks or traces seven cultural objects – *Toy Story*, the Wallace and Gromit short feature films, Nike, Swatch, *Trainspotting*, Euro '96 and young British artists (YBA) – as they move through a great number of transformations in a great number of countries. This book disagrees with Horkheimer and Adorno's thesis. This is nothing new. Indeed, classical cultural studies, that is the British, Birmingham tradition (Hall 1980; Hall and Jefferson 1993), was born out of disagreement with critical theory, in the sense that culture – and the media – was argued to be a site for resistance as much as it was for domination. But we disagree with Horkheimer and Adorno not so much to argue that the social uses of cultural objects and media representations can be used for resistance as well as for domination. Our disagreement with Horkheimer and Adorno is not so much that they were wrong, but that things have moved on. Indeed, we think that theories of both domination through, and resistance to, the culture industry were right. We think however that – since the time of critical theory *and* since the emergence of the Birmingham tradition in the middle 1970s – things have changed.

We think that culture has taken on another, a different logic with the transition from culture industry to *global* culture industry; that globalization has given culture industry a fundamentally different mode of operation.[3] Our point is that in 1945 and in 1975 culture was still funda-

mentally a superstructure. As a superstructure, both domination and resistance took place in and through superstructures – through ideology, through symbols, through representation. When culture was primarily superstructural, cultural entities were still exceptional. What was mostly encountered in everyday life were material objects (goods), from the economic infrastructure. This was true in 1945 and still so in 1975. But in 2005, cultural objects are everywhere; as information, as communications, as branded products, as financial services, as media products, as transport and leisure services, cultural entities are no longer the exception: they are the rule. Culture is so ubiquitous that it, as it were, seeps out of the superstructure and comes to infiltrate, and then take over, the infrastructure itself. It comes to dominate both the economy and experience in everyday life.[4] Culture no longer works – in regard to resistance or domination – primarily as a superstructure. It no longer works primarily as hegemonic ideology, as symbols, as representations. In our emergent age of global culture industry, where culture starts to dominate both the economy and the everyday, culture, which was previously a question of representation, becomes *thing*ified. In classical culture industry – both in terms of domination and resistance – mediation was primarily by means of representation. In global culture industry instead is the *mediation of things*. And this is the central thesis of this book. The book is thus an exploration of global culture industry in terms of a mediation of things.

Towards Global Culture Industry

Let us outline how we think things have changed – how global culture industry differs from culture industry – in a set of theses. In doing this, we do not want to claim that classical culture industry has disappeared. Indeed, in most situations there are impure admixtures of the global and the classical or 'national' culture industry, of the mediation of representations and the mediation of things. This book's focus though is on the emergent. So let us list some changes in a set of theses and then – in the following chapter – address the method that we have tried to follow in the research and the book. The method itself is inseparable from the emergence of global culture industry: from the emergence of things become media, of media become things.

From identity to difference

In Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry the assumption was that cultural products, once fabricated, would circulate as commodities, as identical objects, and in their movement would contribute to capital accumulation. As people purchased the objects, they would atomize them, constituting them as the atomized subjects necessary to the reproduction of capitalism. In global culture industry this changes. Products no longer circulate as identical objects, already fixed, static and

discrete, determined by the intentions of their producers. Instead, cultural entities spin out of the control of their makers: in their circulation they move and change through transposition and translation, transformation and transmogrification. In this culture of circulation (Lee and LiPuma 2002), cultural entities take on a dynamic of their own; *in this movement*, value is added. In global culture industry, products move as much through accident as through design, as much by virtue of their unintended consequences as through planned design or intention. In changing, cultural entities themselves become reflexive in their self-modification over a range of territories, a range of environments.

The products, the objects of Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry, were determinate, that is, determined. The objects of global culture industry are indeterminate. To be reflexive (or reflective) is to be indeterminate (Beck 1992; Beck et al. 1994). The objects of culture industry were determinate, not just in being determined, but in their effects. They had determinate effects on social subjects. In determining their audience, they slotted those subjects into the reproductive cycle of capitalism, the nuclear family, the proper place of the home. The objects of global culture industry are also indeterminate in this second sense. We, as social subjects, relate to them in an indeterminate mode. This does not mean that capitalism is not reproducing on a global scale now. It only means that it is reproducing differently. Now the much less determinate objects of global culture industry encounter the characteristically reflexive individuals of today's informational capitalism (Castells 1996; Kwinter 2001; Adkins 2002; Lash 2002; Urry 2003; Thrift 2004). Determinacy, in Horkheimer and Adorno's sense, is a question of 'identity'. Indeterminacy is a question of 'difference'. In global culture industry, production and consumption are processes of the construction of *difference*. In culture industry, production takes place in the Fordist and labour-intensive production of identity. In global culture industry, it takes place in the post-Fordist and design-intensive production of difference. Yet the paradigm of indeterminacy and difference in global culture industry is less a question of resistance than a way in which capital successfully accumulates.

Commodity to brand

The way in which global culture industry operates through brands is a central theme of this book. If culture industry worked largely through the commodity, global culture industry works through brands. The commodity and the brand are largely sources of domination, of power. The commodity works via a logic of identity, the brand via a logic of difference. How is this the case? A good is a commodity to the extent that it is characterized by exchange-value. The exchange-value of a good is an abstraction from its use-value. A good's exchange-value is expressed in abstract equivalents, in money. Exchange-value is thus a question of

quantity, use-value of quality. Commodities have value in units of abstract equivalence. Goods are commodities to the extent that they exchange, not for other goods, but for money, for units of abstract equivalence on markets. But as a consumer you cannot go to a market and buy a brand. Brands do not typically exchange at all. They are only for sale on capital markets, where their value is a function of the expected future profits above those contributed by all other assets (those that produce the commodity) (Interbrand et al. 1997).

The commodity is produced. The brand is a source of production. The commodity is a single, discrete, fixed product. The brand instantiates itself in a range of products, is generated across a range of products. The commodity has no history; the brand does. The commodity has no relationships; the brand is constituted in and as relations (see Lury 2004 for the argument that the brand is a set of relations between products). The commodity has no memory at all; the brand has memory. The products in which a brand instantiates itself, indeed actualizes itself, must somehow flow from the brand's memory, which is the brand's identity. The Nike brand, for example, has largely succeeded in actualizing itself in football (soccer) products; it has done less well in golf products. Football seems to relate more easily to Nike brand identity and memory than does golf.

Goods as commodities are all alike. They are distinguishable only by the quantities of money for which they exchange. Brands are not alike. Brands have value only in their difference – their distinctiveness – from other brands. Commodities only have value in the way they resemble every other commodity. Brands only have value in their difference. Brands thus are singular or singularities: commodities are homogeneities. The commodity has only exchange-value in Marx's *Capital*: it is abstract and homogenous, expressed in units of equivalence. Marxian use-value is concrete, singular and qualitative. Thus your personal laptop computer or your private copy of Marx's *Capital* is a use-value, dog-eared, with your own marginal scribblings. The brand, like the use-value, is also a singularity. But it is not a concrete, but an abstract, singularity. The brand – say Boss, Nike or Sony – is not the same as my suit, my trainers or my laptop. But your relations with the brand are part of its value.

The commodity is dead; the brand is alive: it comes into being (it becomes) through the generation of a series or range of goods. The brand, constituted in its difference, generates goods, diversified ranges of products. The commodity is determined from outside: it is mechanistic. The brand is like an organism, self-modifying, with a memory. Thus the commodity is characteristically 'Fordist' and works through the production of large numbers of the same product. Brands work through, not generalized Fordist consumption, but through specialized consumption, and the production of many different goods. Commodity production is labour-intensive; branded goods production is design-intensive (Lash and Urry 1994). The commodity works through reproduction of identity; the brand through evermore production of difference.

What kind of *value* is at stake? A good has use-value as a concrete singularity. It has exchange-value (is a commodity) as an abstract universal, or homogeneity. It works as a (part of a) brand, it has, in Baudrillard's sense, 'sign-value'. A good works for me through my hands-on use of it. It works as a commodity in terms of how much money I bought or will sell it for. The brand functions as a sign-value through its and my difference. This difference is generated by (my relation to) a brand. Use-value and the commodity are qualities of products. Sign-value and the brand are not qualities of products: they are qualities of *experience*. This experience is situated at the interface – or surface – of communication (Moor 2003; Lury 2004) of the consumer and the brand. It is a part of events; it is eventive (Malik 2005).

In brief, commodities work through a mechanistic principle of identity, brands through the animated production of difference (Fraser et al. 2005). Thus processes of invention are of necessity central to the brand. Yet the brand's cosmology of difference and invention is at the same time the source of a reassembled system of domination. Global culture industry's emergent regime of power results in inequalities, disparities and deception rarely encountered in Horkheimer and Adorno's classical age.

From representations to things

For Horkheimer and Adorno, culture, though 'industrialized', was still in the superstructure. Horkheimer and Adorno were writing in the heyday of manufacturing capitalism. The principles of the economy, that is, of utility and exchange, had invaded and colonized the cultural superstructure. In this context, culture no longer represented the unique, was no longer autonomous, an end-in-itself. It instead became subsumed in homogenous units, each one identical to the next. Culture had become a utility, a means for something else; it was administered. Culture had become subsumed in the means–end rationality of the commodity. But global culture industry and informational capitalism is less a matter of the base determining the superstructure than the cultural superstructure collapsing, as it were, into the material base. Hence goods become informational, work becomes affective, property becomes intellectual and the economy more generally becomes cultural.[5] Culture, once in the base, takes on a certain materiality itself. Media become things. Images and other cultural forms from the superstructure collapse into the materiality of the infrastructure. The image, previously separated in the superstructure, is thingified, it becomes *matter-image* (Deleuze 1986).

In Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry, mediation was predominantly through representation. In global culture industry, we have the *mediation of things*. Horkheimer and Adorno's culture was commodified. But these were commodified representations and not cultural things.

Mediation by representation is quite other to the mediation of things. The object of art is different from an object like a hammer in that we engage with the former primarily in terms of meaning, while the latter is a matter of doing or 'operationality'. Painting and sculpture are media or mediums, as writers like Rosalind Krauss (1999) insist. They are media before the age of the mass media of communications. But they are media only insofar as their value is primarily cultural: only insofar as their value has to do with meaning. When media become things, however, they no longer exclusively have cultural value. They come very importantly to have use-value and exchange-value.

There is such a thingification of media when, for example, movies become computer games; when brands become brand environments, taking over airport terminal space and restructuring department stores, road billboards and city centres; when cartoon characters become collectibles and costumes; when music is played in lifts, part of a mobile soundscape (Hosokawa 1984; Bull and Back 2004). Media objects in everyday life come to rival manufactured objects. We deal with media as representations – painting, sculpture, poetry, the novel – in terms of meaning. When media become things, we enter a world of operationality, a world not of interpretation but of navigation. We do not 'read' them so much as 'do' them ('Just Do It'), or do with them. This was already incipiently the case with the 'mass media', newspapers, radio and television. Their ubiquity, and the fact that they were not confined to a separate space, as was art, the museum, cinema or indeed the university, meant that they were already encountered as things. They were much more ready-to-hand already than are mediums such as painting or sculpture. What was incipient with the emergence of mass media has become the axial principle of global culture industry. In global culture industry, what were previously media become things. But also, what were things become media.

This book is about seven products in the global culture industry. Four of these cultural objects – Wallace and Gromit, *Toy Story*, (the movement of) young British art(ists), *Trainspotting* – are media become thing-like. Young British art, for example, comprises in part installations, or multimedia spaces. The typical representational space of the picture frame has won only one Turner Prize in the past decade. The dress styles, merchandise and toys for *Trainspotting*, Wallace and Gromit and *Toy Story* have come to rival the films in their visibility. And Disney, Warners and Universal are incorporated in the object spaces of retail outlets and theme parks, parallel to the branded object spaces in airports, shops and department stores. In the case of our three other objects – Nike, Swatch and global football – things, or thing-events, become mediated. When, for instance, Nike's Swoosh logo appears on the (media images of the) cap that Tiger Woods wears in golf competitions,[6] Nike trades on a whole series of mediated connections. These connections help make the space

and time, the flows, in which Nike products (and people) move. In spaces such as Niketowns, Nike's logos – including the word 'Nike' and associated words, symbols and acronyms, including 'Swoosh', 'AirJordan', 'Total Body Conditioning', the tag line 'Just Do It' and the graphic mark that is known as 'Jumpman', among others – do not only mark a line of products, they are also built into the very architecture and fittings of the building. But at the same time, as Jarvis, an assistant in the Los Angeles Niketown, and himself owner of numerous pairs of Nike shoes, said to us, Niketown isn't a store at all; it is 'an experience'. In other words, the physical environment is the setting for immersion in a highly mediated brand experience; very concretely, it is the installation of sensation.

Four of our cultural objects have thus 'descended', as it were, halfway from the superstructure, and the other three have 'ascended' halfway from the base. They meet in the middle in something like a 'media-environment'. In this in-between zone a material environment (such as a football stadium) has become mediatized. And mediums (the films and art) have descended into the environment, as merchandise, as installations. Image has become matter and matter has become image: media-things and thing-media. At stake is a true industrialization of culture. What Horkheimer and Adorno called industrialization was only in fact commodification. It was the commodification of representation. It is the thingification of media that brings the principle not just of the commodity but also of industry into the heart of culture itself. This runs in parallel with the 'culture-ification' of what previously was industry. The above-mentioned design-intensivity and ubiquitous research and design is the culturification of industry: the mediation of things. Thus culture industry entails thing-mediation. And the flux and flow of globalization is what is created by the movements of things-become-media and media-become-things. As we will see in the course of this book, the properties of such movement, such flux and flow (Appadurai 1996), are just as central to global culture industry as the coming together of media and things.

From the symbolic to the real

In *The Matrix*, Keanu Reeves is, by day, Thomas A. Anderson, a software writer in Metacortex, a software firm in turn of the twenty-first-century Chicago. Anderson 'pays taxes', he 'has a social security number'. By night he is hacker-alias 'Neo', developer of myriad illegal applications, of countless 'computer crimes', which he sells to gangs of cyber-punks, hidden on discs stored in his copy of *Simulations and Simulacra* (Baudrillard 1994). Neo, already uncertain which of his two worlds is dream and which is reality, is contacted by Carrie Anne Moss's Trinity. She proposes to him that his night-time obsession is her life-long project, that both of them are searching for the answer to the question, 'What is the Matrix'? 'The answer', she says to him, 'is out there. It's looking for you and it will find you.' Next day, at work, Neo receives a recorded-delivery mobile

phone, on whose other end is Trinity's mentor (and virtual father), Laurence Fishburne's Morpheus. Morpheus tells Neo not only, 'I've been looking for you', but also that 'they're coming for you'. 'They' are the Matrix and their agents, especially their special agent, Smith. Hugo Weaving's agent Smith, together with the Chicago police, capture Anderson/Neo. Smith knows Morpheus is on to Neo, and he knows why. Morpheus knows that Neo is 'the One', who will lead the battle against the Matrix and save the besieged city of Zion. Smith is a machine in the Matrix's future age of the machines. Zion is the last bastion of humanity. Smith and the Matrix want to use Neo to get at Morpheus, 'the most dangerous man alive', a 'known terrorist', and 'help bring him to justice'. They know Neo will soon be with Morpheus. Smith thus inserts a bug, a spidery machine, in Neo through his navel.

Neo wakes up from this 'dream', is phoned by Morpheus and is instructed to wait under Chicago's Adams Street Bridge. Trinity and friends collect him in a car and extract the spider bug from his stomach. Neo remarks, 'Jesus Christ. This thing is real', and is taken to meet Morpheus, who greets him with the words: 'Welcome to the real world.' Neo asks Morpheus, 'Where are we?' Morpheus responds, 'The question is not where, but when.' The answer is that 'we', and the real world, are somewhere in 2199. In contrast, the world of 1999 is a dream, is what social and cultural theorists call *the symbolic*, the world of representations, of ideology (Zizek 1997). The Matrix, the machines, in the real of 2199 are pulling the strings in the dream world of the symbolic of 1999. But this symbolic has extraordinary powers. Though it is 'only a neural interactive simulacrum, a dream-world', 'It is everywhere', intones Morpheus to Neo. The Matrix pulls a world 'over your eyes to blind you'. 'You are a slave, born into bondage.' In the first half of the twenty-first century, Morpheus continues, the humans celebrated their achievements with the full development of AI. But the machines gained their autonomy and the war between the humans and the machines was begun. In this war, it was 'we [the humans] who scorched the sky', destroying the sun, to deprive the machines of solar energy. But the machines switched their energy source to the heat generation of human bodies and, by the end of the twenty-second century, have come to devise ways of growing human beings in fields. The Matrix's goal is to reduce human beings into batteries for machines. The triumph of the machines is the triumph of the Matrix, who, via the special agents, who are 'sentient programmes', want to close down the last bastion of resistance in Zion. Zion is the 'last human city', underground, near the earth's core, where there is still – in the absence of the sun – sufficient heat to sustain human life. The Matrix's plan is to tap into the access codes of Zion's mainframe computers. Zion is served by a number of hovercraft-like ships, which 'broadcast pirate signals'.

Smith lectures the captured Morpheus: the development from 'your (human) civilization to our (machine) civilization' is a question of 'evolution, Morpheus, evolution'. But Neo, 'the One', is even further evolved than Smith. On entering what Morpheus calls 'the desert of the real', he is trained through a set of programs to enter 'replication'. As 'the One', he is on the side of the humans, but is more than a human, and more than a machine. He can do all of Smith's moves and transformations – indeed, he destroys Smith at the end of the film by entering his body, as in Cronenberg's *Scanners* – exploding him from the inside. The Matrix's agents, though they are self-organizing, are 'still based on rules'. There is still an irreducible element of mechanism in the machines. 'The One', in contrast, is a rule finder. He is guided by Morpheus, and by the Oracle, who prophesized his coming. But he must 'walk the path'.

In its entirety, *Matrix* plays off an opposition of the symbolic and the real. The symbolic is above ground. There is still sun. It is Chicago in 1999. The real is underground, in the bowels of the earth: there is no sun. The main characters have a double existence: in Chicago's sunny twentieth-century symbolic and in the darkness of the real, Morpheus, Tank, Dozer, Cypher, Neo and Trinity exist in the real, strapped in chairs in Morpheus's ship, unconscious, connected to electrical terminals. The connections between the symbolic and the real, the 'exits', are in Chicago's subway stations. Connection to the real from the symbolic is by mobile phone, but the truth, the real, is in the mind. The real is not extensive, but intensive. The appearance(s of the symbolic) 'are a mental projection of a digital self', which is where the real action is. Zion rangers like Morpheus and Trinity, 'unplug people' from the (symbolic) matrix to join the struggle in the real. The symbolic is the place of the sense-world, of 'electrical signals interpreted by the brain'. In the real, humans eat tasteless gruel with all necessary vitamins and minerals for the brutal struggles of its sunless desert.

Horkheimer and Adorno's classical culture industry worked through the symbolic, through daylight, the light of Enlightenment and other ideology, through the pleasure of the text, and of representation. Global culture industry is a descent of culture into the real: a descent into the bowels, the brutality, the desert of the real. The real is more evolved than the symbolic. It is brutal, but a question less of body than of mind: bodies are merely energy sources for the mind's real. The inner and underground space in which the human hacker-ships operate is the 'service and waste systems of cities that once spanned hundreds of miles' transmuted into 'sewers' at the turn of the twenty-first century. The real is brutal, a desert, a sewer, a waste-and-service system, below the subways, under the underground. The cosmology of waste and sewage is also that which structures Don DeLillo's *Underworld* (1998). DeLillo's protagonist works in the waste industry and sees the world in terms of a cosmology, a metaphysics of flows of waste. DeLillo's real is this 'underworld' of waste.

Classical culture industry occupied the space of the symbolic: global culture industry the space of the real. Culture industry is Hollywood's

dream-machine, global culture industry brute reality. Global culture industry deals in simulations, but these escape the symbolic, escape representation, and as intensity, as hyperreality, enter a real in which media become things. The symbolic is superstructural: it is a set of ideological and cultural structures that interpellate subjects in order to reproduce the capitalist economy and the (Oedipal) nuclear family. The real is not superstructural; it is not even structural. The real is base. It is in excess of the symbolic. This excess is abjected, spewed out downward through exit-holes into the desert of the real. For Georges Bataille (2000), the abjected was Marx's lumpenproletariat, who made no contribution to the reproduction of capital. To be abjected into the real was to be ejected – out of the bottom (Bataille's 'solar anus') of the symbolic space of form into the *informe*, the formlessness of the real. Global culture industry operates in this space of the real. In the symbolic, signification works through structures to produce meaning. In the desert of the real, signification works through brute force and immediacy. Meaning is no longer hermeneutic; it is operational, as in computer games – that is, meaning is not interpretative; it is doing, it is impact.

Things come alive: bio-power

Culture industry for Horkheimer and Adorno worked through the logic of the commodity. In global culture industry we deal with *singularities* (Appadurai 1986). Singularities are very much the opposite of Horkheimer and Adorno's atomized and atomizing cultural goods. Such atoms work on a principle of Newtonian *mechanism*. For Newton and Descartes, simple bodily substance was atomistic: atoms are identical to each other, they are externally caused. Opposed to the atom were the *monads* of Leibniz (1992). Adorno's commodities are atomistic; the global culture industry singularities are monads. The monad presumes that simple substance is difference. Monads are all different from each other because each carries its own trace. This trace is a monad's memory, its path dependency.[7] Atoms are the stuff of simplicity; monads are the stuff of complexity. Monads are self-organizing and, in this sense, reflexive. The atomized products of Horkheimer and Adorno's classic culture industry worked like mechanism. The self-transforming and self-energizing monads of global culture industry are not mechanistic, but vitalistic. Thus, Arjun Appadurai can speak of a social *life* of things (1986). In global culture industry, things come alive, take on a life of their own. Cultural objects as commodities, as atoms, are mechanisms. Singularities for their part are alive.[8]

Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry is a locus of power, a power that works mechanistically, through external determination of subjects. In global culture industry, power works vitalistically. Vitalist power is *bio-power* (Foucault 1976). Mechanistic power works through the fixity of being. Vitalist or bio-power operates through becoming and movement.

Thus power leaves structures and enters flows. Bio-power, as opposed to 'mechano-power', works through the becoming of self-organization. Not only do resistance or invention operate through movement and becoming in the global age, so too does power. Mechano-power ensures the reproduction of capitalist relations, the family and the proper place (of privacy, propriety and property). As a guarantor of reproduction, mechano-power works through a principle of identity. Bio-power, as Foucault insisted, works through production. It is chronically productive. If reproduction is tied to identity, production is tied to difference, to invention. Bio-power does not stop subjects from producing difference. It is effective through the production of difference by subjects. Brands are not in an ideological or representational (or symbolic) superstructure; they work not transcendentally, but immanently, in the arteries of society. Bio-power, in working through arteries, is less mechanistic than physiological.

Bio-power of the global culture industry works on subjects as if it were monads. But there are two types of monads. There are Leibniz's monads which were closed systems: systems, as he noted, with no windows, no doors. These monads are self-causing, self-determined by their own traces. There are, on the other hand, singularities, which are monads with windows and doors. They are doubly open systems, abstract machines, rhizomes, multiplicities (Deleuze and Guattari 1999; Lazzarato 2002). Global cultural products and subjects can operate either as closed systems or as singularities. Brands are often operationally closed; that is, they work through a kind of exclusion. For example, BSkyB in Britain has used premiership football in this way. You incorporate the object (football). You mediate and brand it. You achieve a monopoly. You exclude others. And you make the viewers pay. But brands can sometimes take on windows and doors. As closed systems, they incorporate aspects of the environment, but they do not form syntheses or connect with other systems. Once they have windows and doors, and form such doubly open systems, they become singularities.[9]

Extensity to intensity

Cultural goods in Horkheimer and Adorno's classical culture industry were commodities, equivalent atoms. These were subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanism. Such goods take on the shape of what Descartes understood as *res extensa*. For Descartes, body and mechanism were a matter of *res extensa* and mind of *res cogitans*. Here we have extensive substance on the one hand and thinking substance on the other. For Descartes, extensive substance was atomistic, and thinking substance monadological. The Latin *res* is a question of substance but also of property. Thus property in manufacturing capitalism (and culture industry) comes largely under the heading of *res extensa*, but in information capitalism and global culture industry, property – that is, intellectual

property, – comes under the heading of *res cogitans* (Castells 1996). In this sense, the information economy is based on the materialization of *res cogitans*. Intellectual property is its legal expression and regulation. Once materialized, *res cogitans* is no longer inside us. As the materialized immaterial, it becomes *res intensiva*. Now extensity is counterposed, not to *cogitans*, but to *intensity*. The point is that the products of the classical culture industry functioned as extensities; those of the global culture industry function as intensities.

For Marshall McLuhan (1997) the intensive was not just thinking substance, but the entire human sensorium, a multimodal notion of sense. For him, the global network, or 'village', of media and communications was the 'outering' of the sensorium. It was the extension of intensity, or of matter-image. In this view, subjects encounter not a signifying structure, or even the materiality of the signified, but the signified or sense itself as it is materialized. This is communication. This is information. The media environment, or mediascape, is a forest of extended intensities, of material signifieds around which subjects find their way, orient themselves via signposts.[10] Thus Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry recalled the extensity of a landscape; today's global culture industry has the intensity of a mediascape, is a scape of flows (Appadurai 1996). The information economy is an intensive economy, an economy of intensities (Thrift 2004); the media environment is an intensive environment.

The rise of the virtual

The brand experience is a feeling, though not a concrete perception. Thus Walter Benjamin talks about the colour of experience (Caygill 1998). What Benjamin is saying is that you may perceive the painting, say, as an object, but what you *experience* is non-objectual – that is, colour. This is the experience of an intensity. Brands may embrace a number of extensities, but they are themselves intensities. Brands are in this sense *virtuals*. As virtuals, they may be actualized in any number of products. Yet the feeling, the brand experience, is the same. Brands typically involve trademarks. The trademark in intellectual property law must be in the public domain. Thus David Beckham as brand is in the public domain. But though they are in the public domain, brands themselves are not perceived. As virtuals, they are ineffable. In semiologist Peirce's sense, brands may be icons. Peirce (1978) understood signification in three modes, via symbol, index and icon. Symbols signify in a Saussurean manner, through the differences among signifiers in a signifying structure. An index signifies much more immediately. Signals are very much motivated by the thing they signify. Thus a baby's cry is an index, as is a train signal, or the thud a punch in the jaw makes. Icons do not for Peirce signify through resemblance, as is commonly held; instead, the sign denotes the object by being like it, and the interpretant represents the sign as a sign of *qualitative possibility*. Symbols are mediatedly attached to objects, and signals quite immediately attached. But icons need not be attached to objects at all.[11] Brands, working through the intensities of their iconography, are one way in which contemporary power works.

In global culture industry, not only the mediascape, but also the cityscape takes on intensive qualities. Architecture and urbanism become less a question of objects and volumes. Urban space becomes a space of intensities. These intensities, which are virtual, describe a certain topology. They describe a space of multimodal experience, not just that of vision, a space of virtualities and intensities that actualize themselves not as objects but as events. Thus Bernard Tschumi speaks of 'event-architecture' (2005), while in Rem Koolhaas's *Harvard Guide to Shopping* (2001) architecture becomes increasingly surfaces of communication, intensities, events. Global culture industry is a matter in this sense of object-events. Our cultural objects are self-organizing systems, sometimes operationally closed, at other points emergent, singularities forming connective syntheses, at many points actualizing themselves in events. Contemporary culture – unlike that of the classical culture industry – is 'event-culture'.

Horkheimer and Adorno's culture industry was dialectical. We are today, perhaps, less dialectical than *metaphysical*. Dialectics presumes ontological difference: between spirit and matter, being and beings, superstructure and base, same and other, friend and foe. Metaphysics is instead a monism, an immanence of spirit-matter, of superstructure-base. The ontological difference of dialectics is displaced by metaphysics' ontology of difference. In this ontology of difference, simple substance itself is difference. This simple substance as matter-image, as difference, is the stuff of global culture industry. The *Weltanschauung*, the *episteme* of global culture industry, is no longer that of dialectical but of metaphysical materialism, based on the materiality of the monad, the reality, as in *Matrix*, of mind. This is matter as multiplicity, matter not as identity but as difference.



2 Method: Ontology, Movement, Mapping

Introduction

The method adopted from the start of this project was to 'follow the objects'. We were self-consciously developing a sociology of the object. The seven objects we chose to follow are a subset of those produced by the global culture industry. They were chosen both for their relatively high visibility in the contemporary landscape and for their potentially long and varied trajectories. They are: the films *Trainspotting* (Miramax, 1996) and *Toy Story* (Pixar/Disney, 1995); the Wallace and Gromit animated film series from Aardman Productions; Euro '96, the European football championship held in 1996; the art movement YBA or (a group of) young British artists; and two global retail brands, Swatch and Nike. In each case, we were concerned with the life-course of the object. If, for instance, we follow a particular film back in time and forward along its biographical trajectory: what are the key components of the story? Who are the central figures? What are the key moments? How are pivotal transactions managed? Where is the film released, successfully or otherwise? What apparently tangential issues divert, recast and redirect the initial project? Throughout, how is the object transformed – and how does it transform – from stage to stage, context to context?

The collection of research materials was concentrated in the three years 1996, 1997 and 1998, but since then our objects have proliferated in a variety of other ways and we can present more selective data here. The branding of Euro '96 spawned an even more focused Euro 2000 and features of Euro '96's branding were also refracted through the World Cup in 1998 in France. The very different animation styles in *Toy Story* and Wallace and Gromit have won Oscars for their respective producers over the past ten years and have now resulted in follow-up feature films, *Toy Story 2* and Wallace and Gromit in *The Curse of the Were-Rabbit*, and big contracts with Disney and Spielberg respectively. *Toy Story 2* in turn appeared on ice in London in 2004. The plastic fashion watch from Swatch has resulted, on the one hand, in a now-waning, but once intense, global wave of collector frenzy and, on the other, in related design and marketing principles being used to create a 'micro' car in joint venture with Daimler-Benz. Nike continues to expand.

There were a number of influences on our understanding of objects. The first was the anthropology of material culture (Miller 1987, 2005), especially the material culture of moving objects, as proposed by Arjun Appadurai (1986) and Igor Kopytoff (1986). As the study went on, during the years of writing, we were influenced by Alfred Gell's anthropology of art (1998). Another major influence came from the sociology of science and technology (Serres 1980; Latour 1993; Callon 1998). We were already familiar with what is now sometimes known as 'media theory' (Lash 2002), specifically with Jean Baudrillard's theory of the object (1996), and with Paul Virilio's analysis of vision and objects in movement (1994). None of the above notions of the object comes from classical subject-object thinking. None of them sees the object as volumetric and mechanical or in terms of *res extensa*, and the external cause and effect of positivism. All these writers understand instead the object as a sort of singularity. In this sense, Appadurai and Kopytoff's 'singularities' resemble 'quasi-objects' as well as the hyper-real object.

A third influence came from taking seriously the notion of biography (which we initially found in Kopytoff 1986), and a consideration of the anthropologist Alfred Gell's claim that it is the study of the life-cycle that defines the anthropological approach (1998: 10–11). Gell argues that it is biographical depth of focus that characterizes anthropology – that is, the attempt to replicate the time perspective of social agents or actants themselves. This way of thinking contributed to our adoption of an understanding of time in which it is not external to (natural or social) objects or agents, but is rather internal to the object, or, to use another vocabulary, may be understood as a process of differentiation. Tracking the movements of our objects thus meant that we began to consider not only the temporal sequencing of production, distribution and consumption, but also to consider our objects in terms of duration or differentiation (Bergson 1991; Deleuze 1991). This enabled us to consider our objects not

as existing ideally in a steady state or condition, but as a set of relations, that is, as always coming into existence (Whitehead 1978; Barry 2001; Fraser et al. 2005).

A fourth influence was the work of Gilles Deleuze (1994) on multiplicity, especially insofar as he presents it in *Difference and Repetition*. Multiplicity was helpful in thinking about an object as always coming into existence as a set of relations. Deleuze writes of multiplicity that it 'must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system' (quoted in DeLanda 2002: 12). What attracted us to this way of thinking was the attention it draws to the variable number of dimensions of multiplicity, and the absence of a supplementary (higher) dimension imposing an extrinsic positionality (or coordinatization), and hence an extrinsically defined unity (ibid.). This Deleuzian notion of multiplicity is informed by mathematical thinking about the manifold and theories of dynamical systems, in which a geometric object such as a curved line or a surface can be modelled as trajectories in a space of possible states (ibid.: 13–14). The relevance of such thinking for the study of the objects of the global culture industry may not be immediately apparent, but the points we took were relatively straightforward: that an individual object may be many or manifold, without having a unity of its parts; that its movements are not to be understood in relation to an external dimension or extrinsic force, but are rather immanent; and that the object's state is embedded in a complex space and cannot be separated from it. As we shall see, the relevance of thinking about geometric objects such as *surfaces* was also greater than might initially have been imagined.

A final influence, from the subdiscipline of economic sociology, was that of Karin Knorr Cetina's work on what she calls global microstructures (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002). Many analysts assume that global flows of (cultural) products are organized in *networks*. But are they? Networks typically have hubs, perhaps terminals, and weak ties. At issue in our biographies, we came to think, was something else. As Knorr Cetina puts it: 'Networks are sparse social structures and it is difficult to see how they can incorporate the patterns of intense and dynamic conversational interaction, the knowledge flows, and the temporal structuration that we observe in the area studied' (ibid.: 910). In Knorr Cetina's terms, global microstructures are forms of market coordination in which participants, although not in a situation of face-to-face interaction, are oriented, above all, towards one another. Global microstructures involve actors who are geographically distant to each other, but nonetheless observe one another in relation to an object. What we took from this was the possibility of investigating the organization of markets in the global culture industry via a study of the organization of markets *by the objects themselves*. This is to consider the markets of the global culture industry

as neither pre-given nor static, as neither simply global nor as merely local, but as dynamically constituted in the movements, the biographies, of objects. What we wanted to investigate is how it is that the objects of the global culture industry may come to act as life-forms, give faces to and animate the markets of the global culture industry.

Methodology

Our methodology of 'following the object' comes principally from Appadurai (1986). As we understand it, this approach does not privilege or focus exclusively on one moment in an object's life: its production, or its circulation in, for example, publicity and advertising, or its reception. It is tempting either to run these three moments together or to give undue prominence to one of them so that one of production, distribution or reception becomes the 'determining instance' which dictates the meaning of the product in every other context. In either case, the result is more or less the same: a delicately balanced sequence of relations is obscured to be replaced by a simplistic set of reductions, ignoring the changes in objects as they circulate through networks, trajectories, cycles or 'lives' of production, promotion and reception (Lury 1993). In contrast, the notion of the biography makes it possible for us to avoid seeing the object as the outcome by which one structure out of a set of predefined forms acquires reality. Instead, it ensured that our concern was with how things actually move, how they 'transition' between many states, how they are (self-)organized as temporal, rhythmic morphologies or coherent behaviours (Kwinter 1998).

A second advantage of the approach is that it avoids an opposition between the local and the global (Tsing 2005). In locating and following the biography of specific objects, our research was designed as a grounded yet globally oriented analysis. In Gell's terms, the field we were concerned with was the spaces traversed by our objects in the course of their biographies. One of the initial aims of the study was to explore the extent of globalization in the culture industry. At a simple level, we found that there was considerably greater reach and penetration for many of these objects than we had suspected. But exploring the object in terms of its biography makes it possible to highlight the limitations of an approach to globalization in terms of extensity, that is, of distance travelled. It makes it possible to show how while local events and contingencies may have global aspects and consequences, these effects and results are also local – somewhere else. But more than this, the Deleuzian differential geometry outlined earlier also makes it possible to hold open the question of the coordination of the rationality – the processes of rationalization – at work in the global culture industry. We tried not to assume a fixed relation – or ratio – between time and space in the global culture industry markets we were studying, but instead saw this relationship as potentially variable, produced in part by the object themselves and as

such something to be empirically investigated. What our findings suggest is that the production of locality by globalization is neither simply a question of reach and penetration or even motility, not merely processes of dis- and re-embedding, but rather of *a changed relationship to context* (Strathern 1999). It is a question of both extensity *and* intensity.

A third advantage of the biographical approach is that it draws upon the historical tendency of anthropology towards what Gell describes as 'a radical defamiliarization and relativization of the notion of "persons"' (1998: 9). Gell suggests that there is a long-standing anthropological preoccupation with the 'ostensibly peculiar relations between persons and things [in] which [things] somehow "appear as" or do duty as, persons'. This preoccupation may be found in anthropological studies of 'primitive cultures' (Tylor 1964), magic (Frazer 1993) and exchange (Malinowski 1984; Mauss 1976; Bourdieu 1977), and is further developed by Gell himself in his own theory of art which 'considers art objects as persons'. In the work of sociologist of science and technology Bruno Latour (1987), there is a similar concern with the agency of objects or 'actants', as he describes them. As the study developed, we too came to think of our objects as having a life. We were using an anti-positivist, a *humanist* method: but what was involved was a humanism of the inhuman. We were involved in a mobile ethnography (in the very broadest sense), in which the ethnos was a community of things.[1]

But how do you follow objects? Very simply, you find out as much about them in as many places in time and space from as many points of view as possible. To do this, we decided to employ not only situational observation, but also processes of observation that were attentive to the temporality of the (subjects and) objects concerned. Our assumption was that an object only makes sense if it is experienced (Crary 1992). And it must be experienced from a point of view. So we tried to proliferate the points of view we adopted. We went to many cities and spoke to 130 or so 'experts' in regard to our objects in detailed interviews – with journalists, curators, festival organizers, intellectual property lawyers, advertisers, designers, distributors, retailers and audiences or users of the objects. However, the excerpts of interviews included in this book are intended neither as records of subjective opinions nor as documentary records of fact, but as fragments of (shifting) points of view. We also collected and consulted trade magazines and newspaper articles. We photographed and filmed the objects, using also the point of view of the camera lens. The visual materials used here are not intended as illustration though, but as non-verbal, non-discursive accounts. This is especially important to the argument being made here because of the focus on the movements of objects. For a visual sociology (Becker 1986; Taylor 1994; Knowles and Sweetman 2004), images compose a moving hypothesis of lines, of shapes, of volumes and images, of things-in-motion; in these visual records of practice, then, the properties or qualities of objects-as-

persons are revealed. A further reason for the use of both the still image of the photograph and the moving image of the video (although of course in this book this image too has been stilled) is that it calls attention to the time of seeing, of the editing of seeing, of movement in points of view. In these ways then, we tried to build a rich description of the objects from a great number of points of view and in many time-places, though these were nevertheless limited (see Bhatt 2004 for a critique of 'flow').

Finally, we also want to reflect, briefly, on the writing of this book. We have deliberately made use of different styles and genres of writing within this single text (and this is not only because the text has more than one author). The intention here is to find some way of representing the multiple temporalities that intersect or converge in a single biography; the different spatio-temporalities at issue here have different intensities, and are, we think, best represented in different ways. So in what follows, scenarios are described, personal biographies recorded, multiple trajectories are juxtaposed and discontinuous temporalities are set alongside one another. In the discussion of the use of interviews and visual materials above, we suggested that the stories and images presented in this book are not intended as illustrations, but as devices by which the situatedness of points of view can be made explicit. In addition, we have made use of different ways of representing the arguments of the book in the layout and design not only of the images, but also of the written text, with the aim of drawing attention to internal differences in register and tone. One of the arguments developed in this book is that the global culture industry is animated, and with this argument in mind, we have chosen to try to animate the text itself. Thus we decided to make a small move towards making the letters of the text into 'characters' (see chapter 5 for a brief discussion of the history of animation), putting lines of argument alongside each other, cutting and editing thoughts, using intervals in space to make associations within and between chapters, and draw the reader into the thesis we are developing. In the biographies that follow, we provide some preliminary examples of this experiment.

BIOGRAPHY I

In tracking the movement of *Trainspotting*, we were able to identify a sequential object biography, in which the object followed a relatively linear path of transformation and dispersion from short story to novel, to film, to poster, to film soundtrack, marketing tie-in products and stage performance. We traced the movement of the object, conducting interviews in theatre and literary scenes in Edinburgh, with literary publishers and Film Four in London, and distributors, exhibitors and journalists in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. We documented the film's reception in advertisements, posters, newspaper reviews and conversations in the USA, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and France. What became clear in collecting this material

was that mapping a biography had to include not only the extensive movements of the object, but also its intensive transformation.

In our interviews, the origins of the film *Trainspotting* were typically located in a literary short story circulated in Edinburgh in the very early 1990s in the context of the New Scottish Writing explosion, 'Trainspotting at Leith Central Station'. Encouraged by Jonathan Cape's Deputy Publishing Director, the author Irvine Welsh extended the story to novel length. The manuscript circulated in Cape's parent firm, Random House, and 3,000 copies were published as a Secker paperback in 1993. Positive reviews encouraged republication as a Minerva paperback. The book obtained a cult following, spawning a series of imitators. For Random House, an unreadable book had been adopted by a post-literate generation (Valentine 1999). In 1994 the book sold 300,000 copies. And then, in 1996, this book about 1980s Scottish heroin culture (it was set in the mid-1980s, the film in the late 1980s) was translated into a hallucinogenic visual style and Britpop soundtrack for a late 1990s cinema audience.[2] The film was shot in four weeks in May and June 1995 in Glasgow, and marketed (but not screened) at the Cannes Film Festival in 1995. Cannes director Gilles Jacob 'loathed the film' and would not have it in the 1996 competition, but a 'Special Screening Out of Competition' was negotiated. This is one of the moments in the biography at which the integration of the object is such that it came to be recognized as separate, discrete and external. Or to put this another way, it is a moment at which the object acquired a sufficient density of internal relations to emerge from its context; indeed, to be sufficiently robust so as to produce its own context, its own past, its own origin. This is the moment in which the object acquired integrity as the artistic work, *Trainspotting*. But this integration should not be seen to produce a static object. Rather, in terms of its biography, the dynamic, integrated object, the film *Trainspotting* continues to be organized, or organizes itself, in a series of sequenced movements.

Optioned to Figment Films, and like *Shallow Grave* co-produced with Channel 4, the cinema distribution rights to *Trainspotting* were bought by Polygram Filmed Entertainment and released in all the territories they then owned: Australia, Belgium, Holland, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. Initially shown on 57 screens in the UK – principally in the West End and Scotland – distribution of *Trainspotting* was extended to 248 screens nationwide by March. The film then went on to successful runs in Europe, the USA (in which territories it had been sold to Miramax)[3] and some territories elsewhere, including Brazil (see chapter 8). In the UK, the promotion of the film property – which, as is now common in the film industry, cost more than the production of the film itself (£1.5 million) – negotiated potential conflict between controversial content and the desired mass audience through careful deployment of PR and advertising. Making use of the considerable number of images taken by a photographer who they had arranged to be on set everyday, Polygram was initially able to

manage the appearance of a promotional package in a very controlled way. As Julia Short of Polygram said, when interviewed in January 1998:

> So in fact what we did was to choose loads of different sets of photography and said right the first set of photography we are going to let out are these shots, then to the women's mags we're gonna give out this set of photography, to the men's mags we're gonna give this set of photography, to the national press we're gonna keep this set and nobody but the national press can use it, then we're gonna have a special set of photography of Ewan McGregor, a special set of Robert Carlisle and we were absolutely rigid in our strategy and then everybody had a completely different photograph to the media that had broken before.

Additionally, a 'teaser trailer' was shot on a day taken out of shooting; its release was planned to coincide with both the release of a video of *Shallow Grave* and the occasion of university students' Freshers' fairs. The timing of the distribution of the film itself was decided by Polygram on the basis of an analysis (internally conducted) of when in any year '18' films were historically most successful (which, they found, is just after Christmas). Television advertising was not agreed until the film was showing, and broadcasting was then linked to the results of weekly exit polls, and used strategically to boost falling attendance.

Most notable in these movements, however, was the poster. This made use of a graphic interpretation, not of the film, but of the literal connotations of trainspotting, the hobby: so, for example the poster reproduced some aspects of the look of a train timetable, as did much of the associated merchandise and publicity. For some people, the poster eclipsed the film. Julia Short says: 'And, in fact, we created the campaign for the world. We didn't realize it at the time, 'cos we just thought it's a film about drugs, about heroin, whose gonna go and see it?' Or, as one newspaper report put it, '[*Trainspotting*] has become a film, and two soundtrack albums and a play in several versions, and a poster so recognizable that newspaper cartoonists parodied it' (Beckett 1998: 6). However, while many aspects of the PR campaign could be rigidly controlled, Polygram could only monitor a fraction of the resulting copies of and improvisations on the design template of the poster that proliferated at this time (and still continue). These included, among numerous others, an accountancy recruitment promotion advertisement, an advertisement for Adidas trainers, the Clothes Show Live exhibition and National Express, window displays in the fashion chain store French Connection, and home-produced posters advertising student housing, among many others. The film thus drew on popular culture and fed back into it. Some of the companies



that appropriated features of the poster design were threatened with legal action by Polygram for breach of copyright. For most, however, the only financial penalty was to make a 'voluntary' financial payment in the form of sponsorship of the football team that is part of a Drug Rehabilitation Unit featured in the film. But in any case, in some kind of happy ending, the owners of the copyrighted literary property were able to capitalize on these illicit appropriations as the cover of the novel was redesigned according to the same template, helping lift sales to 800,000 in 1996 alone.

What is significant about this account in relation to the notion of biography that we are proposing is that some of the movements of the object *Trainspotting* described here, while still sustaining its integration, no longer required (or helped produce) its integrity as an artistic work (cf. Adorno 1991). Instead, it is specific intensive features of the object, rather than any kind of aesthetic unity, which enables some of its movements. To put this another way, certain features become the intensive ordinates of movement. Furthermore, this movement does not occur in relation to a fixed origin. Let us give some examples to illustrate this. The elements of the poster that were most frequently reproduced by the many imitators included: the colour orange, chosen "cos we knew orange was gonna be the fashion colour, where-ever-you-looked lipstick'; the timetable layout; and the use of photographic portraits, a device whose initial rationale was described by Julia Short in the following terms:

> We went through the script and we identified all the characters and the key characteristics of each of the characters, so you know the aggressive one had to be fairly in your face, Sick Boy was obsessed by James Bond, we decided to have a girl on the posters 'cos we didn't want five blokes 'cos we thought we'd alienate the women audience and in fact she wasn't a really major part of the film, but for us it was critical to have a girl on it.

Other features of the object *Trainspotting* that enabled movement included a style of T-shirt, worn by the character played by Ewan McGregor, which became fashionable and was linked to the film (even though the style long pre-existed the film). Wearing such a T-shirt – with the intention of recalling the film or not – could be taken to indicate a participation in the film. Additionally, the second album of *Trainspotting* music included not only songs featured in the film alongside tracks mentioned in the book but not featured in the film, but also songs that had been considered but not included in the film and not even mentioned in the book. Here then the object's movements have multiple origins, some actual, some virtual.

In mapping even this apparently simple biography, it became clear that there were elements of complexity and at least two general principles of

transformation, or coordination, at work (Lury 2004). The first might be described as *translation*, an organizational process in which the product moves in a linear, sequential fashion as a short story to a book to a film to video to television and so on. In these movements, while there are significant translations in cultural form, the object develops and maintains an aesthetic integrity, a discursive unity of sorts, and moves within and across relatively fixed, stable territories. This movement – in which integration results in the integrity of an artistic work – occurs in an indexical or motivated relation to an origin typically understood in terms of authorship, creativity, regional or national culture. It is representational and ownership of the property is secured by the laws of copyright. The second process – in which object integration does not require artistic integrity – may be described as one of *transposition*. This is a process in which it is the intensive features of the object, rather than any kind of aesthetic unity, that enable movement. It is a process of the mediation of things and the thingification of media. The organized movement enabled by transposition is not linear, but is instead characterized by multiplicity, and an intensive, associative series of events, merchandise promotion and publicity, organized in part by the laws of trademark and passing off. And while the movement transposition affords is defined by territorial boundaries, it is not so much a matter of the overcoming of distance from an origin, but rather of the multiplication of origins. As the author of the novel puts it, '*Trainspotting* has been appropriated so much it's like a Richard Branson product. A zone of identity that's used to sell products' (quoted in Beckett 1998: 6).

BIOGRAPHY II

We traced the phenomenon of Young British Art (YBA), a group of young British artists, through exhibitions in London, New York, Paris and Chicago and via curators, collectors, museum directors and art journalists in London, New York, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Tokyo. The phenomenon originated in journalistic commentaries that anticipated the impact of an elastic group of artists created by a self-promotional curatorial community in a series of exhibitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Famously, the artist Damien Hirst curated an exhibition of his own and other artists' work in a show titled 'Freeze' in 1988 (including the artists Mat Collishaw, Ian Davenport, Sarah Lucas, Gary Hume, Fiona Rae, Angus Fairhurst, Anya Gallaccio and Simon Patterson). In 1990 many of the

artists who came to comprise YBA had their work shown at the ICA in London in the New Contemporaries show. International momentum began to acquire velocity with 'General Release: Young British Artists at Scuola di San Pasquale' at the 1995 Venice Biennale, and was assisted by 'Brilliant! New Art From London' later in the same year at public galleries in Minneapolis and Houston. The British Council was involved in both of these events, in the first case as site owners, in the second as brokers between artists and dealers, and the galleries' curators. The Council also brokered touring YBA shows in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. Pictura Britannica, featuring YBA, was also the Council's contribution to the seven-yearly exhibitions of British art in Australia in 1997.

Significantly, however, the object that circulated abroad was not just fine or visual art, but spaces, microcosms of turn-of-the-millennium ('Cool Britannia') British cultural life. In the 'Life/Live' show in Paris in 1996 curators moved (or created) not just the art, but also the art scene or art spaces to Paris. The exhibition physically reconstructed 'Independent Art Spaces'. These were, at the same time, artwork, gallery and commercial spaces. In this and other instances, the artworks and their immediate context of production were merged. In this instance, the artwork is no longer understood in an indexical relation to an origin or source, an author or national culture, but simultaneously with that context, indeed as that context, as a dynamic media environment. There is a contrapuntal relationship between a definite bounded work and an indefinite bounded space, a relationship that works the edge between a specific frame (or artwork) and the distributed system or flow of production of which it is a part (Frow 2002; Lury 2004). In the space, the self-presentation of the artwork requires not interpretation and decoding, but instead invites the perceptual practices of distraction, operationalization, and de- and recontextualization.

In both this and the previous biographical example, significant alteration occurs in the process of transposition across media, including transformations in the object's internal organization. The biographies suggest that elements such as catch-phrases, gestures and graphic details circulate as intensities of sensation or affect. In terms of the process of transposition, they suggest that flow should not be understood in terms of, or at least not only in terms of, the movement of discrete objects with a relatively fixed internal organization, but also as affect, intensity and sensation in or as a series of open-ended object-events.

And such characteristics need to be put alongside the defining characteristics of variability, speed and the miscellaneous identified by Raymond Williams (1974) in his study of television if some sense of the *experience* of global flow is to be captured.

BIOGRAPHY III

We[4] sit and watch people. Some cycling, some roller-skating, some roller-blading; the insignia on their clothes are usually too small to see until they have passed us by. As Rob Shields (1997: 4) comments of his observation in Rodeo Street, Seoul: 'So much happens, so quickly that 180 degree vision would be necessary to begin to "observe" such a scene.' Shields goes on to say that he needs to be 'dazed' to see, since it is only when the observer's body is set 'onto its own auto-pilot of balance and inertial drift ... [that he or she can] concentrate on "taking in" events' (ibid.). Here, by Manhattan Beach in LA, you have to be on the move to see whether it is Adidas or Nike. If we were on blades too, we could move up behind people, overtake, hang back, or turn around to get a second look. Imagining this movement, the placing of insignia on the back of clothing suddenly seems to make sense: you still have a face, even when your back is turned. The insignia are communication in movement, moving communication; not turn-taking, but turn and turn about, as fronts and backs of people move past and around each other.

Earlier, when sitting on the beach, we had seen two boys playing in the waves, both wearing Nike shorts, the letters, NI and KE on each leg of their matching shorts. One is bigger, one is smaller: the shorts are what unite them; the boys are larger and smaller versions of each other. Their shorts gave a flickering message as they ran in and out of the water. This was a visual message, but it also had an aural accompaniment: a bit like a football chant, or at least a crowd chant. NI-KE, NI-KE. This is not face-to-face communication then, but involves the whole body; it involves the use of profiles, of sound, of silhouettes and shapes, and most of all of passing by, of the body in movement.

In shopping malls, we observe how the careful positioning of Nike logos situates the wearer's body in a Cartesian three-dimensional space; the marks or logos are often at right angles to each other. This is most obvious when we observe someone

sitting down, with one leg at a right angle to the other, the ankle of one leg resting on the top of the knee of the other. There is a Swoosh in a contrasting colour on the sole of the shoe, looking out at us. This proper, perpendicular space is also apparent as we watch people walking by, wearing shorts and socks, the Swoosh riding high on the side of their ankles. Yet although their legs move in sequential time, while they are clearly in three-dimensional space, they are simultaneously repositioned by the logos or marks. It is as if the mark of the brand collapses the foreground into the background, and slides now into then; these Sunday morning window-shoppers are moving into and out of multiple planes in space and frames of time. The mark – as a conceptual outline or trace of movement – is seemingly pressed against an enveloping surround of space and time which can simultaneously seem far away *and* near, right here *and* already gone, over there. In short, the mark functions as a recalibration machine in time and space.

A week or so later, one of us is in Portland, sitting outside a coffee-shop, watching a group of young people messing around on a street corner. Not many of them were wearing Nike, although most were wearing trainers, many with built-up soles. They were wearing very wide trousers, sometimes almost down to the ground, the trainers just peeping out, sometimes one leg of the trousers rolled up, the other down to and over the shoe, or wearing long shorts that come down below the knee. They reminded me of Popeye, cartoon characters, what Norman Klein (1993) calls hose-pipe characters. The width of their trousers carries the perceptual and physical width and bounciness of the shoe up through the legs, giving them an apparent elasticity or bendiness. These 'kids' were dancing and fooling around to music. They walk up to, around, by the side of each other; their trainers elevating them just that little bit.

Methodology Revisited

These biographcal scenes indicate how the goal of the study – to follow the chosen objects globally – determined the methodology we adopted. The methodology is not objective but 'objectual'. It is neither positivist nor phenomenological. A positivist method is objective; a phenomenological method is more subjective or constructivist. The objects of study – seven mobile cultural objects – carried with them the method. With this recognition came a number of other understandings. A method that follows cultural objects needs to presume the existence of something like a 'mediascape' (Appadurai 1996) or media environment. In such an environment, the people who make, circulate and use objects are *not external* to such an environment. To put this differently, our method does not assume a distinction between media and society; our assumption is instead that we live in a media-society, and that the users, producers and circulators of media are not on a separate level to others.

In our methodological assumption that media are objects is also implicit the understanding that media are *not texts*. Perhaps media did work at one point predominantly as texts – that is, as if they were narratives, or as if they were discursive in their effects – but to investigate media as objects assumes that they are no longer texts. You *interpret* texts. You *use* objects. Texts, it seems to us, are always outside the interpreter. We disagree with Jacques Derrida's assertion that *'il n'y a pas un dehors du texte'*. By definition, our relation with a text is via a *dehors*: the 'ontological difference' presumed by Derrida entails such a *dehors*. Our point is that media have come to act less as texts and more as things, as platforms or as environments (Kittler 1999). And corresponding to the shift from texts to objects is a shift in how we encounter culture: from reading and interpretation to perception, experience and operationality. As a consequence, we are concerned less with symbolic communication as such than with agency, affect, effect and transformation (Gell 1998: 6). Empirically, of course, producers and audiences or users are at many points both inside and outside of media, but our belief is that there is a tendency for the 'mediascape' and the 'socioscape' to come together. The study maps this cutting (and spreading) edge or surface of our selected objects rather than a representative sample of the contemporary culture industry.

To follow, to track, objects means the investigator must descend into the world with the objects and be on the move with them. Thus the investigator is at once ontologized and mobile. To be in the world with the objects means a shift in knowledge relations, a shift that might be described as one from epistemology to ontology. In 'epistemology' the investigator is, as it were, on a different plane from the object and thus is only able to know it as 'appearance', that is, as form in the Newtonian-Kantian manner adopted by social science positivism. In this perspective, the objects we know are variables or functions. To descend into the world with the objects (and subjects) is to encounter them not epistemologically but ontologically. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) traced the rise of phenomenology in terms of such a move from epistemology to ontology. In ontology we are in the world with objects and have an 'attitude' towards them. An objective epistemology presumes the absence of attitude, interest or intentionality. As consciousness descends into the world with the things, it comes to know them as more than appearances. It starts to begin to come to grips with things-themselves. To encounter something epistemologically, for Kant, is to enter into instrumental or utilitarian relations with it. It is to be a self-enclosed subject encountering it as a self-enclosed object. Knowledge here is from the outside as appearance. And the subject will engage the object as a utility. This sort of epistemological relation – encountering objects as utilities – is what Georg Simmel (1990) described as calculation and what Marcel Mauss (1976) understood as a part of market exchange. It is in

contrast to gift exchange, in which subjects encounter objects as very much the opposite of utilities. In gift exchange the subject opens up. He or she is not a universal, a closed universal, the individual, but a singularity. The object too opens up. It is not closed, as a utility. The object is no longer a particular: it too is a singularity. Subjects and objects as singularities are in the world with one another. Subjects enter directly into the logic of objects. The ontological gaze penetrates. As the object moves out of the epistemological space of extensity, it enters a space of discontinuity, fluidity and excess; it becomes ec-static as an intensity. So this kind of research means getting ontological with things.

But it presumes more than this. It presumes that the investigator does not have a fundamentally different status from the things. Phenomenology does not allow this. In phenomenology, though we move into the world with things, we at the same time make a transcendental move. The phenomenologist wants somehow to know the thing-itself. He or she wants to grasp its ontological structure. There needs to be a transcendental move for this. Phenomenology thus grants consciousness a different ontological status from things. Phenomenology foregrounds perception and experience but still wants to give a different ontological status to consciousness (presuming a difference in kind rather than a difference in degree between objects and subjects). Deleuze makes a distinction between phenomenology and more vitalist assumptions, such as those informing the present study (see also Lash 2005; Fraser et al. 2005). In positivism, consciousness has no attitude: so it is an effect *of* nothing (it is, in Kracauer's terms, a 'senseless amassing of material' (1995: 213)). In phenomenology, consciousness is *of* something. For vitalism, consciousness *is* something. So for us, both ourselves as investigators and the people we study *are* something. The investigators, the subjects and the objects occupy the same world. Investigators, and teams – or project-networks of investigators that may include theorists and practitioners, alongside the subjects and the objects studied – all perceive. The objects in this study are also worlds. They are worlds that are both relational and microcosmic (in Leibniz's (1992) sense). Our objects not only comprise relational worlds, but they perceive relational worlds. Thus investigators, subjects and objects all are engaged in relations of perception with one another.[5] All three know, in their fashion, all reflect, all more or less communicate, all have relations with one another, all are possessed with memory and specific path dependencies (Urry 2003).

All three of subjects, objects and investigators are involved as perceivers and knowers and affect-givers and affect-takers and believers.[6] All three are engaged in sense-making of this world. The way that the investigators make sense is called method. The subjects and objects that we make sense of as human (and post-human) scientists are then not beings, but becomings. And they are making sense of us as we are making sense

of them. Investigators, subjects and objects are, in this view, singularities. They are – through their memory traces and anticipated futures – self-organizing. Yet they are – or may be – in their intensive communications, in their connectivity, operationally open.[7]

These singularities, these becomings, are not only ever changing: they are literally moving in global media space. And the only way for the investigator to keep up with and perceive their transformation is to be mobile too. In each case, in this sociology of objects, we track the object as it moves and transforms through a media environment. At points, these environments transform into assemblages of connectivity and communication. By definition, when objects close (operationally), they encounter other objects and subjects as environments. When they open, environments are transformed into webs of connectivity – what Deleuze and Guattari (1983) call machinic conjunctions and assemblages. At moments in global media space, our objects undergo partial disintegration, a partial descent into entropy. At moments they are discrete, at other points they are indistinct, blurred with their own pasts and futures, overlapping and only partly distinguishable from other objects. Classical sociological methodology tells us that variables must be discrete and mutually exclusive. Our objects are often (but not always) indiscrete and (often but not always) mutually inclusive. They are events (Barry 2001), happening facts (Whitehead 1970; Fraser et al. 2005).

The method at stake here is clearly somehow geographical, or cartographic. At issue is topology, mapping. Sense-making through mapping (as a method) breaks with both the predominant methods in the human sciences: those of positivism and hermeneutics (phenomenology). In positivism, sense-making is achieved by understanding the world in terms of causal determination and classification.[8] In phenomenology it is established in meaning and narrative. In, let us call it cartography[9] – or should it be 'cartology'? – sense-making happens through some sort of navigation. This is thinking not through analysis, in which the complex is broken down into simple components, and reconstituted. It is also not sense-making through interpretation or the construction of narratives. It is, instead, knowing through ways of doing, some sort of orientation or navigation.

But navigation as it is understood here is not the mapping of volumetric and extensive space. The ideas of mental cartography in Kevin Lynch's (1960) and Fredric Jameson's (1991) 'cognitive mapping' and Situationism's 'psychogeography' (Debord 1997) come closer to this book's method. Lynch spoke of the importance of developing mental images of the city. He saw legibility as a guide to the 'good city' in his work as a theorist of planning. In this he drew on five urban elements, including the square, the node and the street. In his description of the disorienting interior of the Bonaventura Hotel in Los Angeles, Jameson also argues that a new kind of mapping is necessary in the postmodern

age. But what we are proposing, in contrast to Lynch and Jameson, is a mapping that is not primarily cognitive. Situationism's psychogeography is in many ways just such an anti-cognitive mapping. Against legibility, Debord (1981) preferred disorientation, insisting that 'life can never be too disorienting'.[10] The Situationist strategy was one not so much of legibility as of *détournement*, in which legible objects were made illegible. Situationism's *dérive* or drift was inspired by the organized urban expeditions of Dadaism. For the Dadaists, the contourless indistinctions encountered in the meanderings of urban space open up possibilities of invention that are inaccessible to the closed psychoanalytic subjectivity of surrealist *écriture automatique*. Psychogeographical *dérive* also puts the focus on movement. It is a mobile method, but, unlike cognitive mapping, *dérive* is locomotion without a goal. *Dérive*'s mobility opens up possibilities in space for constructing situations. It is further understood by Situationism as a method, as 'psychogeographical research' or 'psychogeographical experiments'. *Dérive* is 'a situation-creating technique' (Plant 1992).

The cartographic method we are proffering in this book dovetails with Situationist psychogeography. It is a research technique that presumes a mobile investigator. Its objects are not clear and distinct, but often unclear and indistinct; they are not concrete but more or less abstract. They may contract into clearness and distinctiveness, into legal, economic and cultural closure, yet they are somehow also open to both *détournement* and to entropic drift. The goal of intensive capital accumulation at junctures dissipates into a spectacular and aleatory goallessness. Finally, our space is rather like an experimental, a laboratory, space. It is not inclusive of most of the world's population of subjects and objects, but yet is expanding, intensively.

But our method departs from psychogeography in a number of ways. First, we address not urban space but the spectacular world on a global scale. Second, where we go is determined by the objects we follow. This is not an aleatory experiment such as, for example, the use of a map of London by the Situationists to explore the mountains of the Harz in Germany. For us, the objects are out there ahead of us in their own *dérive*, their own drift: we are following the spectacle/situation rather than creating it. Third, much of psychogeography addresses the effects of urban space on the emotions of the individual. We are not concerned with the effects of urban extensity on the psychology of the individual. We are operating in a world in which the psyche and indeed the sensorium have, in McLuhan's sense, been already 'outered' as the flows, fluxes and neuronal switching points of global cultural networks. So our method is less an urban psychogeography than a global geography of intensities, or an intensive geography (Thrift 2004). Finally, if cognitive mapping deals with subjects and objects as legible and closed systems, we would endorse what might be a more *tactile* mapping of singularities, as described in, for example, de Certeau (1998). At stake for us is a more tactile or, better, a multimodal and proprioceptive mapping.

To what extent is this sort of cartography also a search or a research of the virtual? This, of course Deleuzian, method is developing in the study of cinema.[11] Here the search is for the outlines of a film's or a director's 'time-image' when all we have explicit access to is the shots in a film. But analysis can lead to discussion of a time-image, which is a virtual (although of course every virtual is only so from a certain point of view). In some ways this book is a sort of search into the virtual of the global culture industry. This said, we fear that too much of a focus on the virtual can lead to neglect of the actual. It is often fused with the assumption that the actual is a Euclidean or mechanistic obstacle to the virtual. We think that the (post-)human sciences in mapping mode or cartography must be sciences as much of the actual as the virtual, since for us 'events' are as much actual as virtual. Extensive space is volumetric,[12] while intensive space is some sort of event-space. Communications are not objects. Communications are not volumetric. They are intensities. But communications and, for that matter, units of information are also not only virtuals. They are not systems, but are the actualizations of systems. They are what systems, what self-organizing systems, produce. This book's seven cultural objects are sometimes open, sometimes closed, yet always reflexive systems.[13] In following objects, we are tracking a whole series of object-events, of actualizations.

The Chapters

The chapters of this book look at the global culture industry via the biographies of seven cultural objects from a number of different points of view, in relation to multiple trajectories and at different speeds. As we noted above, we have experimented with the presentation of these biographies by adopting different genres, styles and registers at different moments. Each chapter has a different organization to capture the heterogeneity we seek to describe.

Chapter 3 focuses on one cultural object:[14] Euro '96 – the 1996 European Championship.[15] The game of football is a 'thing' that has become mediated. At stake is the commodification and mediation of play. Football of course has for a long time been commodified, but it has more recently become doubly mediated, first, through branding and association with brands like Nike and Adidas, and second through worldwide broadcasting, especially on pay television.[16] The biography of a cultural product, we argue, may be seen in terms of a 'value-chain' (Miller 2000), in which one side of each link in the chain partakes of the material economy and the other side, of a desiring or libidinal economy, an economy of affect and intensity. In chapter 3, we focus on culture-industry practitioners in recorded music and sports marketing all of whom consistently referred to the tournament as a 'property'. It is a property that

can gain or lose value when it comes together with other 'properties', and those properties can gain or lose value in their attachments.

The chapter opens in the offices of the company East-West Records, whose recording artists are also called 'properties'. Indeed, the company is described as worth little more 'than the sum of its properties'. One of East-West's properties, the adult-oriented pop group Simply Red, was to be promoted via an attachment of their music to Euro '96. East-West was thus to use the tournament as a 'communications platform' to prop up the 'brand value' of Simply Red. This was part of an effort to brand the event, an effort that was not confined to East-West, but was simultaneously, but not always harmoniously, undertaken by UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations), the FA (the (British) Football Association) and others. Thus, the chapter also considers the activities of Music Media Partnerships, whose client is the FA, and whose efforts were in part directed to *de*taching Simply Red from the Championship in order that the latter would not lose its brand value.

The chapter also considers the role of football magazines in the object-event Euro '96 and again documents the attachment of popular music and popular culture in general to football. Many journalists, from magazines such as *Goal*, *Total Football*, *Match*, *Shoot*, *When Saturday Comes* and *World Soccer*, had at points in their biographies worked as pop music journalists. They think of football in terms of popular culture. In conversations they propose that football was still very territorialized and local at a point when British pop music was already opening up a global and liminal space in the 1960s. It is only at the very end of the 1980s, starting in Manchester (with Manchester United) that football starts to become liminal: that football lifestyle and clubbing culture come together. It is at this juncture that football also becomes big business and goes global with the massive media deals of BSkyB, the beginning of the Premier League and high-priced sponsorship.[17] Some thirty years later, football and pop come to occupy similar spaces in the flows of the global culture industry, although not easily. Chapter 3 considers here the implications of the way in which the championship comes to be associated with pop music and a shifting sense of English national identity.

Chapter 4 looks at art in the context of global culture industry, holding parallel two discontinuous temporalities: one internal to 'art history', the other opening out onto local places and global flows. One line maps conceptual art in its broadest sense. Here we see a distinction between first- and second-wave conceptualism, both with lineages from the work of Marcel Duchamp. Both first- and second-wave conceptualism break with formalism, the logic of the aesthetic materials and the flatness of the picture plane as found classically in Picasso, Matisse and Abstract Expressionism. In both, the concept has priority over form or matter. First-wave conceptualism in this context embraces both Minimalism and more literal conceptualism. This supposes a break with

the verticality of the flat picture plane for the horizontality of phenomenology (Krauss 1999). At stake is the horizontality of the ray of perception of the phenomenological vector, the ray of intentionality from viewer to the art object. Here the viewer is situated in a phenomenological field in which he or she must make sense in relation to the artwork. First-wave conceptualism also entails a critique of the institutions of art. Young British Art, we suggest, is part of a *second* wave of conceptualism. This proceeds again from Duchamp, but it does not pass through Minimalism, but instead through pop art: through Andy Warhol and, for example, Richard Hamilton. Whereas first-wave conceptualism is based on propositional thinking or the intentionality of phenomenological consciousness, second-wave conceptualism is pervaded by the popular media. Its 'ideas' are those of the mediascape, of the information economy. If first-wave conceptualism is based on the 'light-on' of the proposition or the phenomenological vector, then second-wave conceptualism is based on the 'light-through' of contemporary media (McLuhan 1997). Taught Minimalism in art college, Damien Hirst, for example, resituates the aesthetic value of artworks from the perception of Minimalist volumes onto communicational surfaces. These artists, as 'Thatcher's children', also were at home in the decomposition of the social and its reordering as both market and media. Second-wave conceptualism is in a very broad sense 'media art', drawing on the more general and vulgar visual culture in a way that the first wave could not. Young British Art does not involve a critique of the institutions of art; it is, instead, a way out of the institutions of art altogether. It breaks with both institutions and critique.

A second trajectory in the biography mapped in this chapter is the meltdown of London's institutions of art. In the aftermath of the Second World War, British art was based more or less on a set of institutions structured around Empire, the tradition of Cork Street, the British Museum and the National Gallery, on the one hand, and the social-political institutions of the industrial working class, radical proletarian local councils and the classical welfare state, on the other. We describe the emptying out of these institutions. This is a literal emptying out and refilling of spaces such as disused warehouses of Canary Wharf and a disused power station in Southwark: the initial YBA exhibitions were in the former, the building of Tate Modern in the latter. The first were created with the demise of radical Labour councils and their displacement by Thatcher-created Development Corporations over the course of the 1980s. One of Thatcher's most famous casualties was the Greater London Council (the GLC) and its leader Ken Livingstone. The second phase of this dislocation and relocation of cultural and political power is marked by the symbolic date of May 2000, when Livingstone came back to power as the first elected mayor of London and the Tate Modern opened its doors. The ex-industrial spaces became not heritage sites, but spaces of flows. In documenting this line (of flight), we look at London as art-

space. London, much more than Paris or New York, is to a large extent such a space of flows. Paris, with its volumetric architecture, its Haussmann structures, its planning, its bars to capital and labour, is much more a space of structure. London has more than twice the level of immigrants per thousand inhabitants than New York. In New York, finance enters from abroad to move into American firms. In London there is financial throughput, from outside, through the City of London, to another outside. New York, since Mayor Rudi Giuliani and especially 9/11, is cleaned up, cleaned out. London is dirty and cluttered. London is the space of flows of migrants, of media, of art, of finance. This supports a popular, or 'street', visual culture that in a number of ways comes to blend with the fuzzy dimensions of visual art.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 describe and outline two processes: one in which media – that were formerly representations – become things, and another in which things that formerly were more exclusively material objects become media. Thus at stake is a certain thingification of media, on the one hand, and, on the other, the media-ification of things. The focus in chapter 5 is on the first of these. The chapter presents the biographies of the three Wallace and Gromit short animated films and *Toy Story*. What we document is the conversion of a film-media object into the things of merchandising. There is in the first instance something extraordinarily thing-like in the animation of both *Toy Story* and Nick Park's shorts in comparison to other cartoons. Historically, most animated cartoons used drawing, whereas *Toy Story* and Wallace and Gromit use computer digitalization and clay-mation. In both cases, things – digital objects and clay models – rather than drawing are at centre stage. Whereas Mickey Mouse and Bugs Bunny (Klein 1993) were (hand-)drawn animation that subsequently become merchandising, in Wallace and Gromit, but especially in *Toy Story*, it is as if the toys (the figures or merchandising) were already there in the film. It is as if they never needed to be converted.

Chapter 6 takes us in the other direction: the mediation of things. Three of our cultural objects – Nike, Swatch and football – were, at one point, things that were not yet media. In chapter 6 we see how the material economic objects of what may have been Marx's industrial capitalist economic base become the mediatic quasi-objects of what is now a more McLuhanite communication. An economy that mostly produced objects in its focus on the means of production now mostly produces quasi-objects in its foregrounding of the means of communication. Here, we are at a halfway point between base and superstructure. Whereas films such as *Trainspotting* and Wallace and Gromit descend part way from superstructure of spirit and subjective culture into the base, our other products, Nike, Swatch and football, ascend part way from the base. The focus in this chapter is empirically on Nike and Swatch. In both cases, products communicate as parts of an abstract object, the brand. The brands Nike and Swatch operate as if they were *interfaces* or surfaces of communication. As surfaces of communication (Moor 2003), they open up space for intensities of affect. They become what we call abstract objects through the centrality of design and distribution in their production. Cinema and the recording industry always had such a pre-eminence of the design process. In these cases, more value was produced in bringing out new 'prototypes' than was involved in the reproduction of existing prototypes, that is, making say fifty or two hundred copies of a film for distribution or pressing one million records. With the centrality of the design process, Nike and Swatch, classical industry makes its entry into the culture industry.

Chapter 7 looks at how the movements in time and in space of cultural objects produce an ebb and flow of pattern and randomness. Here we look at the entanglement of subjects in the global flows of the culture industry, drawing on observations, interviews and visits to end-users of the products. Among the things mentioned here, a number were initially received as mementoes or gifts, sometimes as 'free gifts', or promotionals, while others were acquired as commodities. Think for example of the flooding of households with the branded toys enclosed in every Happy Meal at McDonald's or their Burger King equivalent. Not just these gifts, but the ubiquity of unpaid-for web advertisements, muzak, music from other people's car boom boxes, the proliferation of television channels, junk email, junk fax and junk text-messaging means that the flow of capital these days is also a flow of waste. This is not necessarily an overload, but such a co-presence of a multiplicity of event-communications continually threatens to explode into entropy, into pure randomness. Such too is the junk space that architect Rem Koolhaas (2001) has described: spaces of communication, and signage always threatening a descent – and in fact often descending – into junk, into entropy. Yet what seems like an entropic overload of cultural signs finds new value through the distinctive configurations of the brand. The logo, say McDonald's golden arches, repeated in the central zones of all major global cities, serves as stabilizer, as an orientation point in a seemingly chaotic urban space. Such stabilizations through repetition create pattern out of the randomness of junk capital, and lay the bases for new rounds of capital accumulation. Through its very ubiquity, and especially its repetition, the brand creates patterns for the recognition of distinctiveness in the public domain.

Chapter 8 shifts the point of view to Latin America and in particular to Brazil. It starts with an overview of culture industry and especially what are effectively new media – extra-terrestrial television, internet, brands, mobile phones – in Latin America, and then focuses on the movements of *Trainspotting* and to a lesser extent Wallace and Gromit, into and through Brazil. In Britain, the classical national culture juxtaposition of institutions was a question of Empire, the organized working-class and social

policy institutions of the state. In Brazil, the meltdown that characterized the rise of global culture industry was otherwise. There was, to begin with, a dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. At the same time, a disaffected intellectual youth, sometimes in prison and finding politics impossible, went into cultural collectives such as the cine-clubs as an alternative form of politics. After the dictatorship, the personnel of the cine-clubs went into distribution, circulation and production in the global culture industry. We trace these figures and speak to them. We look at the importance of what Knorr Cetina calls 'global microstructures' in this context, as our objects become the locus of a global interaction order. Yet at the same time, the prime Brazilian genres of culture are not cinema or the novel, but dance, football, music, carnival. If the global culture industry can find a place in London's intensity, then it is more fully at home in São Paulo's hyper-intensity, and full out-of-controlness, its (un)control. Global culture industry in the future may be much less the thing of Paris, New York, London or even Los Angeles than of São Paulo, Mexico City, Shanghai, Mumbai and Lagos. National culture industry gave us linear, extensive culture on a national manufacturing model: it described what was fully a culture of extensity. Global culture industry, involving an informational culture of intensity, may one day soon be most at home in these fast-mutating and mega-cities, in these (still) emergent economies.

In the context of the above, chapter 9 constitutes a theoretical reprise and a view towards possible futures of the global culture industry.

3 Football Biography: Branding the Event

In this chapter, the biography of the football championship Euro '96 is presented in terms of the intersection of a set of trajectories: of pop music and stars, of newspapers and magazines, of television and radio, of lifestyles, of global branded sponsors, of English and European football histories, of governing bodies and of a host of small, medium sized and large commercial companies. All of these trajectories intersect in a time–space conjunction, an intensive month, the very brief existence of Euro '96. What we are suggesting is that the biography of a single object combines the paths of such value chains (Miller 2000; Fine 2002) in an event.

Simply Red

It is 1996. Elyce Taylor works in the London office of East-West Records, a label owned by Time-Warner with branch offices throughout Europe. Simply Red is an East-West recording band. East-West was founded in 1990. Simply Red is an East-West 'property'. A record company, if it is itself in the background and thoroughly unbranded,[1] is worth not a lot more than the sum of its constituent properties. In this case, the properties also include the artists Jimmy Nail, Chris Rea and Phil Collins.

Notes

Chapter 1 Introduction: Theory – Some Signposts

1 See more recent work on culture industry, including Angela McRobbie (1998, 1999), Du Gay (1997), Hesmondhalgh (2002) and Bennett (1995).
2 This, of course, was a central thesis of Georg Simmel (1997).
3 This is on the whole a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, Hollywood's revenues from outside the USA have only superseded revenues from within the past decade, and Nike only developed an explicit global strategy from 1995.
4 See Hardt and Negri (2000).
5 Indeed over 50 per cent of foreign direct investment in Latin America over the past decade has been in telecommunications.
6 Nike pays more than $40 million to associate its logo with Tiger Woods.
7 We are indebted on this point to John Urry (2003).
8 Singularities are special types of monads. They are monads with windows and doors. We are grateful to Maurizio Lazzarato for this point.
9 In *Simulacra and Simulations*, Baudrillard's idea of hyperreality seems to be a question of such cybernetic power.
10 In this environment, signs become 'signage'. See the interview of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown with Rem Koolhaas and H.-U. Obrist in Koolhaas (2001).
11 Peirce writes, 'An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not' (1978: 102).

Chapter 2 Method: Ontology, Movement, Mapping

1 We are aware that what we are doing is not ethnography in a conventional sense, not even a multi-site ethnography. Yet to the extent to which Deirdre Boden infused this study, it does have a certain ethnographic spirit in the sense of a microsociology. The method that we are proposing and have used is more a cartography than an ethnography.
2 *Trainspotting* was made for US$2.6 million: it was the biggest grossing British film of 1996. Its UK box office take was $15 million in 1996, making it the fourth highest UK grossing British film in history at that point in time.
3 *Trainspotting* opened on 19 July 1996 in the USA. The opening weekend take was only $262,000, but it grew to $1.4 million for the week of 2 August, when it moved to number thirteen in the American charts. It continued to play for a relatively long time, until December 1996, by which time it had grossed $16.5 million.
4 In this instance, the 'we' was Deirdre Boden and Celia Lury.
5 Deleuze in his cinema books takes this further. Phenomenology presumes that consciousness selects an aspect of the object through what is described as a ray of light from consciousness to the object. This object however is an extensive object, much like those in the classical culture industry. In global culture industry the light is already inside the object itself (Alliez 1995; Rodowick 2001). In global culture industry we are dealing with what McLuhan (1997) called 'light-through', not 'light-on' media. Thus in classical culture industry image comes from consciousness and the cultural medium takes the place of matter. In light-through global culture industry, the medium becomes image-matter.
6 For Gabriel Tarde, the fundamental relation of what Simmel would call sociality was affect: affect is comprised of, on the one hand, belief and, on the other, reflection; see Lazzarato 2002.
7 Note that this limit on self-organization is not a question of causality or determination. Indeed, reflexive singularities will open themselves up to external transformation through communication and connection. Such an opening is a chance to escape, or for *dérive* (in the Situationist sense), from both the external determination of mechanism and the incarcerating solipsism of pure self-organization. Here is where we part ways with Luhmann. We think that contemporary capitalism is based on a shift from mechanistic to self-organizing systems, and the main battle is not between mechanism and self-organization (or reflexivity), but between more or less closed and more or less open self-causing systems. For a system to survive, of course, it must be operationally closed. The systems we address are thus more ephemeral and en route to formation or decay in comparison to Luhmann's.
8 This is of course an oversimplification to make a point. It draws on the highly valuable ideal-typical contradistinction of vitalism and mechanism in Prigogine and Stengers's *Order out of Chaos* (1984). Positivism in social science is not fundamentally Newtonian. Its functionalist assumptions in Durkheim are of course more Darwinian than Newtonian. The same is true in Parsons, whose *Social System* (1955) and subsequent works took on a number of cybernetic assumptions as well. Functional causation is very different from Newtonian causation (Cohen 2001). For both Durkheim and Parsons there needs to be an important dimension of self-modification, so that social systems preserve their identity and do not drift into entropy. The other main type of positivism encountered in social science is in the various guises of multivariate analysis. This statistical positivism breaks of course with Newtonian causation for a probabilistic universe, one of Brownian motion, of thermodynamics, of quantum mechanics. Norbert Wiener was operating in such an environment (Hayles 1999). The point for us is that Durkheim's and Parsons's systems are extensive in that their components are institutions and organizations. They were writing in an extensive era of capitalism and modernity. Durkheim's and Parsons's systems were also operationally closed, as is Niklas Luhmann's *Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft* (1999). Yet the components of Luhmann's systems are communications and thus intensive. In this sense, it is Luhmann and Deleuze and Guattari who provide a paradigm for this study. All are dealing with intensive systems in today's regime of capitalist accumulation. They are opposite sides of the same coin, however. Luhmann's autopoietic systems are operationally closed and provide a framework to think how domination and closure work in relation to this book's cultural objects and much more widely. Deleuze and Guattari's open machinic assemblages (or rhizomes) give a framework to think of invention, of political possibility.
9 See Multiplicity (2003) and Rogoff (2000).
10 We are grateful for discussions of psychogeography to Nicolas Firket of AMO in the Office of Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) in Rotterdam.
11 We are indebted to Manuel DeLanda and Axel Roch for discussions of topology and operationally open systems as emergent systems. We are indebted to Il Chang, Rob Shields and Maria Lakka for discussions on the virtual in cinema.
12 We are indebted to discussions with Catherine David for an idea of cartography that challenges notions of volumetric space. One of the first places where cartography as method was introduced is in Guattari and Rolnik 1996.
13 We take on board Deleuze and Guattari's distinction in *What Is Philosophy?* between event and exhibition. As cultural objects and their interrelations affect operational closure, they tend to become exhibitions; as they open, they can be events.
14 In the case of Euro '96 the object at stake is, in everyday terms, an event. In more sociological terms, if the object is classically understood as located in the realm of necessity, as an event it occupies that of contingency.
15 This is the European nations' championship involving, for example, England, Italy and Spain and not the Champions' League, the European club championship involving, for example, Real Madrid, Manchester United and AC Milan.
16 From our point of view, branding and multichannel television are, alongside the Internet and mobile phones, 'new media' (Lury 2004).
17 While Manchester United plc is clearly now a private good, the Football Association's rights in the England team are also rights in a *public* good (as are their rights in the FA Cup). The sort of public value at stake is not economic value. It has more to do with individual and especially collective identity than with economic value. One of the functions of UEFA and the FA in their role as regulatory bodies is to ensure that such public goods do not decline in value. The reworking of the public, the private and the voluntary is encountered in a number of our cultural biographies.

Chapter 3 Football Biography: Branding the Event

1 See Horn and Laing 1990.
2 Interview, Elyce Taylor, East-West Records, 22 July 1996.
3 See Liz Moor (2003) for further discussion of branding and music events.
4 Interview (Bird & Bird), intellectual property lawyers for FA in Euro '96, July 1996.
5 Interview, Rick Blastley, MMP, 19 July 1996.
6 Interview, Taylor.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview, Andy Strickland, 18 July 1996. Both *90 Minutes* and *Goal* have now closed.
9 Ibid.
10 Interview, Michael Hodges, *90 Minutes*, 19 July 1996.
11 Interview Gavin Hills, *England Magazine*, 22 July 1996.
12 Interview, Adam Brown, Football Supporters' Association, 14 May 1996.
13 Interview, Hills.
14 Ibid.